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THE NOT-SO-EXTRAORDINARY CASE OF AIKENS V. INGRAM:

RULE 60(b)(6) RELIEF FROM FINAL JUDGMENTS IN THE
FOURTH CIRCUIT*

INTRODUCTION

Professor John Oakley of the University of California, Davis,
once quipped about an "Exam Question from Hell masquerading as a
federal lawsuit."' This may be a good way to describe the recent
Fourth Circuit case of Aikens v. Ingram,2 where, after a series of
twists and turns, a high-stakes lawsuit failed on procedural grounds.
In Aikens, a high ranking military official allegedly retaliated against
a deployed subordinate officer by hacking into his personal e-mails 3
The federal district court dismissed the action, directing the plaintiff
to exhaust his remedies before an Army administrative body that
ultimately lacked subject matter jurisdiction.' Upon returning to
federal court, the plaintiff requested that the district court reopen his
claim under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 60(b)(6),' which allows a
court to reopen final judgments in "extraordinary" situations.' The
district court declined to do so.7 Ultimately, the Fourth Circuit, sitting
en banc, concluded that the circumstances were not sufficiently
extraordinary to mandate Rule 60(b)(6) relief.8 A review of the
procedural quagmire in Aikens raises the question: if this was not an
extraordinary circumstance, what is?
Rule 60(b) lists five circumstances where the federal courts may
reopen a final judgment.9 It also has a sixth "catch-all" provision, 0
* ©2012 Frederick Johnson.
1. See CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT & MARY KAY KANE, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS

110 n.3 (6th ed. 2002).
2. 652 F.3d 496 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
3i Id. at 498.
4. Id.

5. Id.
6. Id.
7. Id.
8i Id.; see Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 202 (1950) (finding no
extraordinary circumstances warranting Rule 60(b)(6) relief).
9. Rule 60(b) reads in full:
On motion and just terms, the court may relieve a party or its legal representative
from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the following reasons:
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Rule 60(b)(6), which allows a federal court to reopen judgments for
"any other reason that justifies relief."'" Shortly after the addition of
the catch-all provision to the federal rules in 1948, the Supreme
Court, in Ackermann v. United States,1 2 construed this language to
require relief only in truly extraordinary circumstances. 3 The
Ackermann Court held that a "free, calculated, [and] deliberate
choice[]," 1 4 such as the failure to appeal an adverse verdict, is not an
extraordinary circumstance, and therefore the party raising it should
not be entitled to relief from a final judgment under Rule 60(b) (6). 15
In Aikens, the Fourth Circuit relied upon the sixty-year-old rule
first announced by the Supreme Court in Ackermann.16 The Fourth
Circuit could have clearly and justly distinguished Aikens from
Ackermann on at least two grounds. First, in Aikens, the procedural
defect was an anomaly of the law that served only as a procedural
formality; the strategic choice pursued by Aikens's attorneys
benefited the court at the expense of no one. Second, the court in

(1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
(2) newly discovered evidence that, with reasonable diligence, could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b);
(3) fraud (whether previously called intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation, or
misconduct by an opposing party;
(4) the judgment is void;

(5) the judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged; it is based on an
earlier judgment that has been reversed or vacated; or applying it prospectively is
no longer equitable; or
(6) any other reason that justifies relief.
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The federal rules are binding upon the Court and authorized by
statute under the Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 2071-2077 (2006).
10. Note, FederalRule 60(b): Relieffrom Civil Judgments, 61 YALE L.J. 76, 81 (1952)

("60(b)(6) ... is a catch-all clause to permit correction 'for any other reason [not specified
in 60(b)(1)-(5)] justifying relief from the operation of [a final] judgment.' " (quoting FED.
R. Civ. P. 60(b) (1948)).
11. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).
12. 340 U.S. 193, 198 (1950).
13. See Ackermann, 340 U.S. at 199-200, 202 ("Neither the circumstances of
petitioner nor his excuse for not appealing is so extraordinary as to bring him within ...
Rule 60(b)(6)."); see also infra Part II (discussing judicial interpretation of Rule 60(b)(6)).
14. Ackermann, 340 U.S. at 198.
15. Id.
16. Aikens v. Ingram, 652 F.3d 496,503 (4th Cir. 2011) (en banc).
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Aikens could have followed a line of cases which generally suggest,
despite Ackermann, that Rule 60(b)(6) can be an appropriate remedy
for correcting a procedural error brought about, in part, by actions of
the court, which result in a substantial injustice.17
The Fourth Circuit declined to draw either of these distinctions
in Aikens 8 Instead, the Fourth Circuit validated what this Recent
Development will refer to as the "categorical approach" to Rule
60(b)(6) relief.'9 Under the categorical approach, any freely made
choice by the petitioning party that is fatal to the original claim is an
absolute bar to reopening a verdict under Rule 60(b)(6).20 The
application of the categorical approach to the facts of Aikens
undermines the very purpose of Rule 60(b)(6), which is to provide
litigants, as well as courts, with some measure of flexibility when
procedural anomalies cause unjust final judgments.2'
This Recent Development argues that the time has come to relax
the assumption that erroneous final judgments caused in part by the
petitioner's own tactical choices categorically bar Rule 60(b)(6) relief.
In doing so, it identifies trends that depart from the categorical
approach. Some of these trends reflect the sound policy supporting
Rule 60(b)(6) relief, while others run counter to the policy of such
relief. This Recent Development also notes that there are growing
inconsistencies with the analysis of Rule 60(b)(6) motions and urges
that the federal judiciary make an effort to bring doctrinal clarity to
the extraordinary circumstances requirement created by Ackermann.
Finally, this Recent Development discusses two frameworks through
which Rule 60(b)(6) relief can be analyzed.
Analysis proceeds in three parts. Part I briefly discusses the facts
of Aikens and addresses the strategic mistakes made during the
course of the litigation. Part II analyzes the extraordinary
17. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863-64 (1988)
(using Rule 60(b)(6) to vacate an adverse judgment when the district court judge
incorrectly failed to recuse himself); Thompson v. Bell, 580 F.3d 423, 444 (6th Cir. 2009)
(using Rule 60(b)(6) to correct an erroneous dismissal based on lack of exhaustion);
Whitmore v. Avery, 179 F.R.D. 252, 259 (D. Neb. 1998) (using Rule 60(b)(6) to correct an
erroneous denial of a stay pending administrative exhaustion). Judge Diaz's concurring
opinion in Aikens distinguishes Thompson and Whitmore on grounds that Whitmore was a
pro se representation and Thompson involved a challenge to a state execution. See Aikens,
652 F.3d at 505 (Diaz, J., concurring).
18. See Aikens, 652 F.3d at 505.
19. This language arises from a discussion in Ungar v. Palestine Liberation
Organization, 599 F.3d 79, 81, 84 (1st Cir. 2010). The "categorical" language was also used
in Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 864.
20. See Aikens, 652 F.3d at 502.
21. Note, supra note 10, at 76-77.
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circumstances requirement. This includes a discussion of two early
Supreme Court decisions, the use of Rule 60(b)(6) to remedy court
errors, and the recent explicit rejection of the categorical approach by
the First Circuit. Part III discusses problems created by the Fourth
Circuit's Rule 60(b)(6) analysis and proposes a framework to analyze
Rule 60(b)(6) relief. In so doing, it examines practical problems and
credibility issues that are created by the holding of Aikens. The
analysis concludes by synthesizing a possible rule for future federal
courts to use in determining whether Rule 60(b)(6) relief from a final
judgment is required.
I. AIKENS v. INGRAM

A.

Facts of Aikens

Frederick Aikens was promoted to the rank of colonel in the
North Carolina National Guard in 2001, leaving his prior position as
lieutenant colonel temporarily vacant.22 Adjutant General William
Ingram selected Peter von Jess as Aikens's replacement.23 In so
doing, the General allegedly overlooked another candidate who was
slated to get the position, which caused friction between von Jess and
Aikens.24
According to Aikens, he received multiple complaints regarding
von Jess's performance and behavior as lieutenant colonel, including
complaints from "nearly every field grade officer in Plaintiff's unit."25
As a result, Aikens filed two negative officer evaluation reports
concerning von Jess's performance as lieutenant colonel.2 6 General
Ingram overrode and invalidated both reports, prompting Aikens "to

22. See Aikens, 652 F.3d at 498. Colonel is the fifth highest pay grade in the United
States Army. See US Army Military Ranks, Lowest to Highest, MILITARYFACTORY.COM,
http://www.militaryfactory.com/ranks/army-ranks.asp (locate "Colonel" listing and follow
"Pay Scale" hyperlink) (last visited Apr. 11, 2012).
23. Aikens, 652 F.3d at 498.
24. See Aikens v. Ingram, 71 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 1544, 1545 (E.D.N.C. 2008),
affd, 612 F.3d 285 (4th Cir. 2010), affd en banc, 652 F.3d 496 (4th Cir. 2011). According to
the district court, Colonel Aikens was originally informed that he would be able to choose
his own lieutenant. See id.
25. Amended Complaint
13, Aikens v. Ingram, 513 F. Supp. 2d 586 (E.D.N.C. 2007)
(No. 5:06-CV-00185).
26. See Aikens, 652 F.3d at 498. According to Aikens's 2006 complaint, von Jess was

involved in an altercation with a major in the National Guard, which prompted the initial
negative evaluation. See Amended Complaint, supra note 25, 14.
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file a complaint for undue command influence with the Department
27
of the Army Inspector General.
After the complaint for undue command influence was
substantiated, 28 Aikens alleged that he became the victim of repeated
29
unjustified Army investigations at the behest of General Ingram.
Between 2003 and 2005, General Ingram ordered at least three
special investigations of Colonel Aikens. 3° The first two investigations
31
did not indicate that Aikens engaged in any improper conduct.
Then, according to Aikens, two of his fellow officers monitored the
computer he used while he was deployed in Kuwait. 32 Specifically,
von Jess allegedly used the equipment to screen Aikens's personal emails from North Carolina.3 3 Based on these e-mails, the Army
concluded that Aikens maintained a "hostile command climate and
inappropriate relations with women. ' 34 As a result, Aikens resigned
from the Guard under pressure in June 2005. 35
In 2006, Aikens initiated an action against von Jess, Ingram, and

two other officers who allegedly aided in intercepting Aikens's
e-mails, 36 both in their capacity as North Carolina National Guard
employees and as individuals, for violations of his privacy and Fourth
Amendment rights. 37 He filed his claim in the U.S. District Court for

the Eastern District of North Carolina. 38 Aikens contended that the
interception of his personal e-mails violated his Fourth Amendment

protections against unreasonable searches and seizures and that his

27. Aikens, 652 F.3d at 498.
28. "Inspectors general will use the conclusion of 'substantiated' when a
preponderance of credible evidence, as viewed by a reasonable person, exists to prove the
allegation." U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 20-1, INSPECTOR GENERAL ACTIVITIES AND
PROCEDURES § 7-2(1) (Nov. 29, 2010).
29. See Amended Complaint, supra note 25, 91 22-38.
30. See Aikens, 652 F.3d at 498-99.
31. Id. at 498.
32. Amended Complaint, supra note 25, 1$ 27-28.
33. See id. 1 28-29.
34. Aikens, 652 F.3d at 499.
35. See id.
36. See Amended Complaint, supra note 25, 27.
37. He filed actions for violations of his privacy and for violations of his Fourth
Amendment rights both under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (2006) and under the implied cause of
action created by Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of the Fed. Bureau of Narcotics,
403 U.S. 388, 389 (1971). Amended Complaint, supra note 25, 919 46-62.
38. See Aikens v. Ingram, 513 F. Supp.*2d 586, 586 (E.D.N.C. 2007), relief denied, 71
Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 1544 (E.D.N.C. 2008), af-id, 612 F.3d 285 (4th Cir. 2010), affd en
banc, 652 F.3d 496 (4th Cir. 2011).
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2005 resignation "amounted to constructive discharge."3 9 He sought
to amend his status to active duty and to recoup back pay.4 °

Aikens's claim presents an interesting constitutional question in
its own right.41 However, the factual basis for Aikens's claim and the
underlying constitutional issue in Aikens were never addressed during
the four years of litigation. In 2007, the district court concluded that
Aikens had failed to exhaust his administrative remedies.4 2 It
dismissed Aikens's action without prejudice and directed Aikens to

bring his case before the Army Board for Correction of Military
Records ("ABCMR").43 The district court noted that if it was

incorrect in its determination that ABCMR had jurisdiction, then
Aikens could "return to federal court."" At the time the claim was

dismissed by the federal district court, the statute of limitations had

already run,45 unless equitable tolling applied.46 Aikens attempted to

comply with, rather than appeal, the district court's decision by
39. See Aikens, 652 F.3d at 499. In North Carolina, a claim of constructive discharge
requires a showing of "two elements: deliberateness of the employer's action, and
intolerability of the working conditions." Bristow v. Daily Press, Inc., 770 F.2d 1251, 1255
(4th Cir. 1985). These claims are uncommon but not unheard of in a military context. See,
e.g., Madock v. McHugh, No. ELH-10-02706, 2011 WL 3654460, at *23-24 (D. Md. Aug.
18, 2011), affd, 2012 WL 886889 (4th Cir. Mar. 16, 2012) (finding that reassignment of
plaintiff after she was diagnosed with multiple sclerosis did not constitute constructive
discharge).
40. Aikens, 652 F.3d at 499.
41. The question of whether the Army may constitutionally intercept the personal email communications of a deployed soldier without a warrant seemingly has never been
addressed. The inquiry would likely focus on the reasonable expectations of privacy of a
deployed soldier. Cf. United States v. Warshak, 631 F.3d 266, 288 (6th Cir. 2010)
("[B]ecause they did not obtain a warrant, the government agents violated the Fourth
Amendment when they obtained the contents of [a civilian]'s emails."). Army Regulation
380-19 requires a banner-screen display on any computer set up by the Department of
Defense notifying the user that their e-mails may be intercepted for "all lawful purposes."
U.S. DEP'T OF ARMY, REG. 380-19, INFORMATION SYSTEMS SECURITY § 4-1(1) (Feb. 27,
1998). Aikens alleged that the Army violated Army Regulation 380-19, but he did not
allege that the Army failed to display the required notification. See Amended Complaint,
supra note 25,
43-44. For an interesting discussion of the constitutional rights of
military service men and women, see generally Major Alison Martin, How Far Can They
Go: Should Commanders Be Able To Treat Hotel Rooms Like an Extension of the
Barracks for Search and Seizure Purposes?, ARMY LAW., June 2004, at 1 (discussing
Fourth Amendment protections against unreasonable searches and seizures in military
barracks and other temporary housing facilities).
42. See Aikens, 513 F. Supp. 2d at 588.
43. See id. at 594.
44. Id. at 592.
45. See Aikens, 652 F.3d at 509 (King, J., dissenting).
46. Equitable tolling is "[t]he doctrine that the statute of limitations will not bar a
claim if the plaintiff, despite diligent efforts, did not discover the injury until after the
limitations period had expired." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 618 (9th ed. 2009).
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submitting his claim to ABCMR.47 However, the district court was
incorrect, and ABCMR ultimately concluded that it lacked
jurisdiction to hear the constitutional claims.48
Upon returning to federal district court, Aikens filed a motion to
reopen his claim under Rule 60(b)(6). 49 He attempted to reopen,
rather than file a new claim, because of the high likelihood that the
three-year statute of limitations5" had run on his claim.5" However,
the district court denied Aikens's motion. 2
On July 6, 2010, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit
reviewed the district court's decision for abuse of discretion. 3 It
reasoned that the district court could have properly concluded that
the facts of Aikens did not constitute an extraordinary circumstance
requiring Rule 60(b)(6) relief.5 4 On Aikens's petition, 5 the issue was
reheard by the Fourth Circuit sitting en banc.5 6 On July 13, 2011, the

47. See Aikens, 652 F.3d. at 498 (majority opinion).
48. See id. at 499.
49. Three of the four opinions from the Aikens en banc rehearing provided
commentary on the operation of the statute of limitations under North Carolina law. See
id. at 502-03; id. at 506 (Diaz, J., concurring); id. at 517-18 (King, J., dissenting). The most
thorough discussion came in Judge King's dissent, which included almost instructive
commentary on how equitable tolling could operate in North Carolina. See id. at 517-18.
While noting the lack of North Carolina case law on point, Judge King indicated that
"misleading acts" by the defendant have been a ground for tolling in the past. See id. at
517. Judge King further stressed that it is the harm done to the plaintiff, and not the bad
faith of the defendant, that necessitates equitable tolling. See id. at 517-18.
50. Because 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not specify a statute of limitations, the Supreme
Court has specified that each state's personal injury statute of limitations should be
controlling. Wilson v. Garcia, 471 U.S. 261, 280 (1985). In North Carolina, this means that
§ 1983 disputes are subject to a three-year statute of limitation. See N.C. GEN. STAT. § 1-52
(2011).
51. It is likely that uncovering the application of the statute of limitations in Aikens
would have involved novel questions of North Carolina law. See Aikens, 652 F.3d at 516
(King, J., dissenting). Further, any tolling would have been equitable in nature, which
raises interesting questions about the doctrine of unclean hands, the "principle that a party
cannot seek equitable relief or assert an equitable defense if that party has violated an
equitable principle, such as good faith." BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 286 (9th ed. 2009). In
North Carolina, "[w]hen equitable relief is sought, courts claim the power to grant, deny,
limit, or shape that relief as a matter of discretion. This discretion is normally invoked by
considering an equitable defense, such as unclean hands or laches .... " Roberts v.
Madison Cnty. Realtors Ass'n, Inc., 344 N.C. 394, 399, 474 S.E.2d 783, 787 (1996).
52. See Aikens v. Ingram, 71 Fed. R. Serv. 3d (West) 1544, 1545 (E.D.N.C. 2008),
affd, 612 F.3d 285 (4th Cir. 2010), affd en banc, 652 F.3d 496 (4th Cir. 2011).
53. See Aikens v. Ingram, 612 F.3d 285, 290 (4th Cir. 2010) affd en banc, 652 F.3d 496
(4th Cir. 2011).
54. See id. at 291.
55. Opening Brief of the Appellant on Petition for Rehearing En Banc at 2, Aikens,
652 F.3d 496 (2011) (No. 08-2278), 2010 WL 5313789, at *2.
56. See Aikens, 652 F.3d at 496.
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Fourth Circuit, in a six-to-five decision,57 affirmed the district court's
decision not to reopen Aikens's claims.58 After four years of
litigation, Aikens's complaint failed on procedural grounds.
Key to the court of appeals' reasoning was the standard of
review. The Fourth Circuit reviewed the district court's actions for
abuse of discretion.5 9 Application of this standard, which may have
support from the Supreme Court,60 has the obvious problem that "an
appeal from denial of Rule 60(b) relief does not bring up the
underlying judgment [before the court] for review."' 61 At least one
other circuit applies the standard of review differently, reviewing the
facts on a Rule 60(b)(6) motion for abuse of discretion, but reviewing
the underlying legal issues de novo.62 This standard is preferable
because it would allow the court of appeals to define the contours of
the extraordinary circumstances doctrine without being confined to
the district court's interpretation.
B.

TacticalDecisions

There is a simple mechanism available that could have alleviated
the "hellish ' 63 procedural circumstances that arose in Aikens.
Aikens's counsel could have requested a stay, pending administrative
exhaustion. 4 If granted,65 there would have been no need to request

57. Judge Niemeyer wrote the majority opinion in both the 2010 and 2011 decisions.
See id. at 498; Aikens, 612 F.3d at 286. Judge Diaz concurred in the 2011 decision. See
Aikens, 652 F.3d at 504 (Diaz, J., concurring). Judge King wrote a dissenting opinion for
both decisions. See Aikens, 652 F.3d at 507 (King, J., dissenting); Aikens, 612 F.3d at 291
(King, J., dissenting). Judge Davis dissented upon rehearing en banc. See Aikens, 652 F.3d
at 520 (Davis, J., dissenting).
58. See Aikens, 652 F.3d at 498.
59. Id. at 501.
60. Browder v. Dir., Dep't of Corrs., 434 U.S. 257, 263 n.7 (1978).
61. Aikens, 652 F.3d at 501 (quoting Browder, 434 U.S. at 263 n.7) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
62. See Ungar v. Palestine Liberation Org., 599 F.3d 79, 83 (1st Cir. 2010). One
scholar, commenting on Aikens, contended that the abuse of discretion standard was
inappropriate, and that a de novo standard should have been used because the court based
its decision on reasoning different than the district court. Scott Dodson, Rethinking
ExtraordinaryCircumstances,106 Nw. U. L. REV. COLLOQUY 111, 116 (2011), http://www
.law.northwestern.edu/lawreview/colloquy/2011/23/LRCol1201ln23Dodson.pdf.
63. See supra note 1 and accompanying text (referring to the "Exam Question from
Hell").
64. Aikens, 652 F.3d at 502-03.
65. The fact that the district court indicated that Aikens could "return to federal
court" if ABCMR lacked jurisdiction may inform how the district court would have ruled.
Aikens v. Ingram, 513 F. Supp. 2d 586, 592 (E.D.N.C. 2007), reliefdenied, 71 Fed. R. Serv.
3d (West) 1544 (E.D.N.C. 2008), affd, 612 F.3d 285 (4th Cir. 2010), af-td en banc, 652 F.3d
496 (4th Cir. 2011).
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the court to reopen its prior judgment. An argument can be made,
using existing case law,66 that the district court should have made a
motion for a stay sua sponte. 67 But accountability for this failure still
lies with Aikens's attorneys, as it is reasonable to expect an attorney
to anticipate statute of limitations problems. 68 The question examined
by this Recent Development is not whether failure to request a stay is
a mistake. Rather, this Recent Development questions whether that
mistake should categorically bar relief.
Notwithstanding the attorneys' failure to request a stay, this
Recent Development maintains that Rule 60(b)(6) relief should have
been available and that the Fourth Circuit could have used Aikens to
rebuke the categorical trend. The categorical bar of Rule 60(b)(6)
relief from a final judgment is simply not appropriate where, as here,
a procedural defect leads to a disproportionate injustice.
There are several reasons for this. First, in a case such as Aikens,
where there seemed to be a shared understanding among the parties
that Aikens intended to litigate the matter,69 the procedural interest
in requesting a stay is low, but not absent. As demonstrated by the
protracted litigation over Aikens's request for remedial measures, the
consequence for failure is harsh. Because of a small technical mistake
by his attorneys, Aikens's chances of recovering anything were
severely hampered.
The natural progression may be to use attorney malpractice to
resolve issues created by attorney error.7 ° But malpractice is not an
adequate substitute for real litigation on the merits of the original
dispute." The defendants in Aikens were alleged to have intentionally
66. See Whitmore v. Avery, 179 F.R.D. 252, 259 (D. Neb. 1998) ("This dismissal was
not one on its merits so as to allow immediate appeal. Nor could the petitioner have
[complied with court] instructions and exhausted his remedies because the claim was not
one that could be exhausted .... [T]his is the type of case that warrants the exceptional
relief contemplated by Rule 60(b)(6).").
67. Judge King made this argument in his dissenting opinion. Aikens, 652 F.3d at 51415 (King, J., dissenting).
68. See Richard D. Bridgman, Legal Malpractice-A Considerationof the Elements of
a Strong Plaintiffs Case, 30 S.C. L. REV. 213, 223 (1979) (noting that a high percentage of
legal malpractice cases involve attorneys missing deadlines).
69. See Aikens, 513 F. Supp. 2d at 592.
70. See Christopher G. Meadows, Comment, Rule 60(b)(6): Whether "Tapping the
Grand Reservoir of Equitable Power" Is Appropriate To Right an Attorney's Wrong, 88
MARQ. L. REV. 997, 997 (2005) ("When a litigant suffers an adverse judgment solely
because of his attorney's misconduct, an issue arises with respect to how the courts should
allow the litigant to proceed: by granting relief from the prior judgment pursuant to Rule
60(b)(6) or steering the litigant toward a malpractice suit against the attorney.").
71. See id. at 1007 (noting that policy favoring malpractice suits can "make[] the total
burden on the courts greater because now an entirely new case must be fully litigated").
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participated in retaliatory conduct;7 2 Aikens's attorneys, however,
merely failed to secure a technical, albeit important, procedural
checkmark in a fairly complex litigation scheme. Thus, the levels of
culpability are not comparable. Further, given the novelty of Aikens's
claims, it would be hard to predict the damages suffered as a result of
his attorneys' error.73
The majority in Aikens not only faulted Aikens for failing to
request a stay, they also faulted Aikens for failing to appeal74 and for
failing to attempt to refile the litigation under an equitable tolling
theory.75 It is troubling that the court placed so much weight on these
two decisions, as they cannot seriously be considered erroneous. First,
it is relatively easy to understand from an attorney's perspective the
decision not to appeal. It would be wasteful to have yet another panel
of federal judges speculate about ABCMR's administrative
jurisdiction when simply submitting the matter to ABCMR would
almost assuredly be quicker and less expensive.76 Similarly, the
decision to request Rule 60(b) relief, rather than test the sparse North
Carolina equitable tolling case law, was a reasonable course of action.
In short, Aikens was presented with an anomalous procedural
situation. His attempts to comply with an impossible mandate of the
court proved fatal. In situations like the one that confronted Aikens,
Rule 60(b)(6) relief should be available.
II. JUDICIAL INTERPRETATION OF RULE 60(b)(6)
Rule 60(b)(6) was first adopted in 1948. 77 Its inception was
largely an attempt to remedy the "haphazard" and unsatisfying
common law remedial devices that the federal courts used to reopen
final judgments.7" As one early commentator noted, these common
law devices suffered from two defects: first, "[c]orrection of an unjust

72. See Aikens, 652 F.3d at 498-99 (majority opinion).
73. See Formyduval v. Britt, 177 N.C. App. 654, 658, 630 S.E.2d 192, 194 (2006) ("A
plaintiff alleging a legal malpractice action must prove a 'case within a case,' meaning a
showing of the viability and likelihood of success of the underlying action."), aff'd by an
equally divided court, 361 N.C. 215, 639 S.E.2d 443 (2007) (per curiam).
74. Aikens, 652 F.3d at 502.
75. See id. at 503.
76. See id. at 513-14 (King, J., dissenting); cf Cal. Med. Ass'n v. Shalala, 207 F.3d 575,
578 (9th Cir. 2000) (finding that where an appeal would be a "meaningless formality" Rule
60(b)(5) relief should not be denied due to a defective appeal).
77. Mary C. Cavanagh, Note, InterpretingRule 60(b)(6) of the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure: Limitations on Relief from Judgment for "Any Other Reason," 7 SuFFOLK J.
TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 127,128 (2002).
78. See Note, supra note 10, at 76 n.3.

1222

NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 90

judgment was frequently left to the chance of litigating before a court
that could manipulate an elusive doctrine," and, second, "in some
cases, the arsenal of remedies [available to federal judges] was simply
too scant to furnish even flexible courts with a rationale for relief." 9
Accordingly, Rule 60(b)(6)'s initial purpose was to preserve
prior common law justifications for reopening judgments, as well as to
allow courts flexibility to reopen judgments in novel situations, if
justice so required.8" It was designed to be a catch-all clause,
providing courts the flexibility to reopen judgments in situations not
contemplated by common law or by Rule 60(b)(1)-(5).81
Since its inception, there has been a tension between the need for
finality in judgments and the desire to correct gross injustices in the
civil process.8 2 Despite this tension, there is surprisingly little
academic analysis of Rule 60(b)(6). s3 The body of case law reflects the
federal judiciary's attempt to "reconcile the need for correction of
unjust judgments with the aims of finality in litigation."' s4
At its most basic level, Rule 60(b)(6) analysis should balance the
competing interests of finality against the demands of justice; in
applying Rule 60(b)(6) the Supreme Court has considered "the risk of
injustice to the parties in the particular case, the risk that the denial of
relief will produce injustice in other cases, and the risk of
undermining the public's confidence in the judicial process."85 To
flesh out the inherent conflicts driving Rule 60(b)(6) analysis, several
prerequisites to relief have emerged. For instance, the Supreme Court
has held that Rule 60(b)(1)-(5) are mutually exclusive with Rule
60(b)(6).86 Under the mutual exclusivity requirement, to receive Rule
79. Id. at 77.

80i See Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 614-15 (1949).
81. See supra note 9 for the full text of Rule 60(b).
82. See James W. Moore & Elizabeth B.A. Rogers, Federal Relief from Civil

Judgments, 55 YALE L.J. 623, 623 (1946) ("Opinion varies sharply concerning the extent to
which relief should be granted from a judgment. This divergence necessarily results from a
clash of the two principles that litigation must terminate within a reasonable time, but that
justice must be accorded the parties.").
83. See Dodson, supra note 62, at 112 ("[T]he literature on Rule 60(b)(6) is some of
the sparsest in all of civil procedure.").
84. See Note, supra note 10, at 76.
85. Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864 (1988) (holding
that Rule 60(b)(6) is an available means to correct an adverse judgment where a judge
incorrectly failed to recuse himself).
86. Id. at 863 n.11. Other requirements are that: Rule 60(b)(6) motions must be timely
made; the underlying cause of action must be worthy on the merits, meaning, essentially,
that the parties state a claim on which relief can be can be granted; and the judgment must
not unreasonably prejudice the other parties to the action. Heyman v. M.L. Mktg. Co., 116
F.3d 91, 94 n.3 (4th Cir. 1997).
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60(b)(6) relief, the petitioning party must show that he falls outside of
Rule 60(b)(1)-(5) by showing that extraordinary circumstances
existed that prevented the petitioner from seeking relief through
traditional means.8 7 The general approach has been to treat
erroneous final judgments by the court not as Rule 60(b)(1) inquiries,
but instead as Rule 60(b)(6) inquiries."8 Rule 60(b)(1) allows for relief
from a final judgment for "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or
excusable neglect."8 9 The significance of using Rule 60(b)(6) rather
than 60(b)(1) to reopen a final judgment when a court makes an
erroneous judgment is twofold. First, a party petitioning under Rule
60(b)(6) has a relaxed time consideration.9" Second, that party must
make a showing of extraordinary circumstances. 9
A.

Emergence of the ExtraordinaryCircumstancesRequirement

The extraordinary circumstances requirement is probably the
greatest substantive barrier to an individual seeking Rule 60(b)(6)
relief.92 It originated in two early Supreme Court decisions: Klapprott
v. United States93 and Ackermann v. United States.94 Comparing
Klapprott and Ackermann illustrates the tension between the need for
finality in litigation and the existence of an equitable remedy to
correct unjust procedural flaws.
Klapprott was the first Supreme Court case to address Rule
60(b)(6) relief in any context. The petitioner, August Klapprott, was
German by birth.95 He was granted American citizenship in 1933.96
During World War II, the United States instituted civil proceedings
to strip Klapprott of his citizenship. 97 Concurrently, Klapprott was
87. See Liljeberg, 486 U.S. at 863 n.l; Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 613
(1949).
88. See, e.g., White v. Investors Mgmt. Corp., 888 F.2d 1036, 1040 (4th Cir. 1989)
(appearing to grant Rule 60(b)(6) relief where a district court improperly ordered
judgment).
89. Fed. R. Civ. P. (60)(b)(1).
90. See Fed. R. Civ. P. (60)(c)(1).
91. See Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 202 (1950).
92. See Cavanagh, supra note 77, at 131 ("The two most frequently cited reasons for
denying 60(b)(6) motions are the timeliness and extraordinary circumstances elements
93. 335 U.S. 601 (1949).
94. 340 U.S. 193 (1950).
95. Klapprott,335 U.S. at 602.
96. Id.
97. Both Klapprott and Ackermann were civil, not criminal, proceedings; the
government had to prove that the petitioners had committed civil fraud when they
undertook the citizenship oath. See Ackermann, 340 U.S. at 195; Klapprott, 335 U.S. at
616-17 (Rutledge, J., concurring).
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arrested on a separate criminal charge of "conspiracy to violate the
Selective Service Act." 9 Klapprott's attempt to answer the challenge
to his citizenship and to contact the American Civil Liberties Union
was allegedly thwarted by the Federal Bureau of Investigation. 99
During this time, Klapprott was shuffled between three detention
centers in New York, Michigan, and Washington, D.C.1" While he
was detained, a default judgment was entered against him in the
citizenship proceedings and his citizenship was revoked. 10' In 1946, a
New Jersey district court heard a petition to vacate the default
judgment and to allow a new trial on the merits in the citizenship
proceedings. 12 This petition was denied in 1947 and appealed to the
Supreme Court in 1948.103
Justice Black announced the Supreme Court's fractured decision,
stating that Klapprott's "allegations set up an extraordinarysituation
which [could not] fairly or logically be classified as mere 'neglect' on
his part."' x" Specifically, Klapprott's allegations indicated "far more
than a failure to defend the denaturalization charges due to
inadvertence, indifference, or careless disregard of consequences. "'105
Justice Black argued that, due to the extraordinary circumstances
faced by Klapprott, the judgment should be reopened "under the
'other reason' clause of 60(b)."1" 6 While five Justices concurred in the
result, only two Justices reached their conclusion on Rule 60

grounds. 107
Ackermann reached the Supreme Court less than two years
later."' The Ackermann Court formalized the extraordinary
circumstances requirement and endorsed a very narrow reading of

98. Klapprott,335 U.S. at 604.
99. Id. at 604-05.
100. Id. at 608.
101. See id. at 605.
102. Id. at 607 (indicating that the action was brought by the Citizens Protective
League).
103. See id. at 601, 608-09.
104. Id. at 613 (emphasis added).
105. Id.
106. Id. at 614.
107. See id. at 614-16. Two Justices believed that the Rules of Civil Procedure were
inapplicable to denaturalization proceedings. Id. at 619 (Rutledge, J., concurring). The
fifth "swing vote" joined "in the judgment of the Court as limited to the special facts of
this case and without expressing an opinion upon any issues not now before this Court."
Id. at 616 (majority opinion). Interestingly, on remand, the district court found the
evidence offered in support of Klapprott's motion unconvincing and denied Rule 60(b)(6)
relief. Klapprott v. United States, 183 F.2d 474, 475 (3d Cir. 1950).
108. Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 193 (1950).

2012]

RELIEF FROM FINAL JUDGMENTS

1225

Justice Black's plurality opinion in Klapprott. 9 The opinion was
written by Justice Minton, 110 who was not a member of the Klapprott
Court, and Justice Black offered a strongly worded dissenting
opinion."'
The facts of Ackermann were very similar to those of Klapprott.
The petitioner, Hans Ackermann, and his wife, Frieda, were both
German natives who were naturalized in 1938.112 Ackermann's
brother-in-law, Max Keilbar, was also a German-born naturalized
citizen. 1 3 Actions to cancel the citizenship of Ackermann, his wife,
and Keilbar were filed in 1942, shortly after the United States entered
World War 11.114 All three actions were condensed at trial, "and
separate judgments were entered ... cancelling and setting aside the
orders admitting them to citizenship.""' 5 Ackermann was placed in an
"Alien Detention Station" shortly after this judgment. 1 6 He and his
wife were advised by a government immigration official that "they
would be released at the end of the war" and that the cost of appeal
would necessitate the sale of their home." 7 Based on this advice, they
chose not to appeal their case." 8 However, Keilbar chose to appeal
his judgment, and he was successful in overturning the cancellation of
his citizenship. 9
Ackermann then attempted to reopen his final judgment under
Rule 60(b)(6) on the ground that his case was substantially identical
to Keilbar's case. 2 ° This motion was denied. 2 ' In upholding the
denial of Rule 60(b) relief, the Supreme Court distinguished
Klapprott from Ackermann, stating that Klapprott "was a case of
extraordinary circumstances."' 22 To Justice Minton, the difference

109. See id. at 202.
110. See id. at 194.
111. See id. at 205 (Black, J., dissenting) ("It does no good to have liberalizing rules
like 60(b) if, after they are written, their arteries are hardened by this Court's resort to
ancient common-law concepts.").
112. Id. at 194-95.
113. See id. at 195.
114. See id.
115. Id.
116. Id. at 196.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 195.
120. Id. at 195-97.
121. Id. at 196.
122. Id. at 199.
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between Klapprott and Ackermann was "the difference between no
choice and choice."'1 23 He wrote:

Petitioner made a considered choice not to appeal, apparently
because he did not feel that an appeal would prove to be worth
what he thought was a required sacrifice of his home. His
choice was a risk, but [a] calculated and deliberate ... choice.

Petitioner cannot be relieved of such a choice because hindsight
seems to indicate to him that his decision not to appeal was
probably wrong ....

There must be an end to litigation

someday, and free, calculated, deliberate choices are not to be
relieved from. 124
Ackermann sets a very high standard indeed for Rule 60(b)(6)
relief. Justice Minton did not consider the penalty that Ackermann
faced at any point during his analysis in Ackermann. Although
citizenship revocations were civil proceedings, the consequences

amounted to detention and deportation-a more severe penalty than
in many criminal cases.125 Ackermann implicitly followed a categorical
approach to Rule 60(b)(6) relief. That is to say, any adverse strategic

choice by the petitioner disqualified him from relief from a final
judgment under Rule 60(b)(6), regardless of the severity of that
adverse strategic choice. 126 It is exactly this categorical mindset that is

at issue in Aikens and should be discarded in favor of a more
balanced approach.

123. Id. at 202.
124. Id. at 198.
125. See Klapprott v. United States, 335 U.S. 601, 616-17 (1949) (Rutledge, J.,
concurring) ("[B]y the device or label of a civil suit, carried forward with none of the
safeguards of criminal procedure provided by the Bill of Rights, [the rights of Citizenship]
can be taken away and in its wake may follow the most cruel penalty of banishment.").
126. The Supreme Court expanded this concept, disallowing an exception to res
judicata for "relitigation of an unappealed adverse judgment where ... other plaintiffs in
similar actions against common defendants successfully appealed the judgments against
them." Federated Dep't Stores, Inc. v. Moitie, 452 U.S. 394, 395 (1981). It explained that
there is "no general equitable doctrine ... which countenances an exception to the finality
of a party's failure to appeal merely because his rights are 'closely interwoven' with those
of another party [who successfully appeals]." Id. at 400. However, the Court provided a
meaningful ground, which seems to set pure procedural issues apart from the doctrine of
res judicata, by noting that "'res judicata is not a mere matter of practice or procedure
inherited from a more technical time than ours.' " See id. at 401 (quoting Hart Steel Co. v.
R.R. Supply Co., 244 U.S. 294, 299 (1917)).

2012]
B.

RELIEF FROM FINAL JUDGMENTS

1227

The ExtraordinaryCircumstancesDoctrine Post-Ackermann

Since Ackermann and Klapprott, there has been relatively little
doctrinal clarity on what constitutes an extraordinary circumstance
and when Ackermann should apply. Rule 60(b)(6) was introduced in
part to remedy the doctrinal inconsistencies provided by common
law,127 but the rule seems vulnerable to the same problems of
haphazard and inconsistent application.
Despite this doctrinal uncertainty, Rule 60(b)(6) continues to be
a valuable tool available to litigants in several situations. Further,
there are a few trends in the case law that, if formalized and adopted,
could help to bring clarity to the application of Rule 60(b)(6). One
scenario where Rule 60(b)(6) relief is commonly requested involves
an oversight made, in part, by a court. In Liljeberg v. Health Services
Acquisition Corp.,128 the Supreme Court confronted the problem that
neither a federal statute nor Rule 60(b)(1)-(5) provided relief for an
adverse judgment caused by a judge's failure to recuse himself. 2 9 The
Court purported to accept that the judge lacked knowledge about the
transaction that created the potential conflict of interest; however, it
found that the mere risk of the appearance of impropriety required
that the judge recuse himself. 3 ° Even if the judge could have
discharged his duties without bias, an objective observer could
reasonably question the judge's impartiality, thus calling the
credibility of the court into question.' The Court ultimately decided
that Rule 60(b)(6) was an appropriate remedy. 132 In doing so, the
Court stated that relief was neither "categorically available nor
categorically unavailable" for a judge's failure to recuse himself. 3 3

127. See Note, supra note 10, at 76-77.
128. 486 U.S. 847 (1988).
129. See id. at 862-64. In Liljeberg, the presiding district court judge was on Loyola

University's Board of Trustees. Id. at 850. Meanwhile, John Liljeberg was negotiating with
Loyola University over the purchase of land to construct a hospital. Id. "Health Services
Acquisition Corp. brought an action [against Liljeberg] seeking a declaration of
ownership" over a hospital corporation. Id. "The success and benefit to Loyola of these
negotiations turned, in large part, on Liljeberg prevailing in this litigation .
i...
Id.
130. See id. at 864 ("[W]e accept the District Court's finding that while the case was

actually being tried [the judge] did not have actual knowledge of [his own conflict of
interest in] the dispute .... "). However, the Court did express skepticism concerning the
judge's knowledge of the conflict of interest. Id. at 865. ("[I]t is remarkable that the judge,
who had regularly attended the meetings of the Board of Trustees since 1977, completely
forgot about the University's interest in having a hospital constructed on its property in
Kenner.").
131. See id. at 864-65.
132. See id. at 863-70.

133. Id. at 864.
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Under Liljeberg, the analysis for Rule 60(b)(6) relief from a judge's
failure to recuse himself should consider the loss of credibility to the
court, the potential effect on third parties, and the potential for
4
injustice to the parties.1
When a court makes an inaccurate judgment of any kind, there
is a serious threat to the credibility of the court. Further, there is a
high risk of injustice to the parties. The factors articulated in Liljeberg
should be considered when evaluating whether a Rule 60(b)(6)
motion should be granted when a court made a mistake. And, in some
instances, they have been considered. The Fourth Circuit, in Compton
v. Alton Steamship Co.,"' held that Rule 60(b) relief was proper

where a district court judge made several mistaken conclusions of law
in a default judgment proceeding, resulting in the defendant's liability
for "two hundred times" the maximum amount under applicable
law. 3 6 The court did not indicate whether it was acting under Rule
60(b)(1), 60(b)(4), or 60(b)(6), but its discussion reflected the court's
belief that relief would have been proper on any of the three
grounds. 37 The defendant company's failure to appear or defend

itself at the initial trial was not controlling in the court of appeals
decision.13

Further, in Whitmore v. Avery,139 a Nebraska district court found
that Rule 60(b)(6) relief was warranted where the court failed to stay
proceedings pending administrative review, even though the
petitioner had failed to request a stay.' n It indicated that the

procedural circumstances that arose out of the court's incorrect
administrative determination were extraordinary circumstances that
warranted relief from a final judgment. 4 1
134. Id. It should be noted that much of the language used in Liljeberg was seemingly
constrained to the narrow situation of a judge's failure to recuse himself. See id. passim.
135. 608 F.2d 96 (4th Cir. 1979).
136. Id. at 101. In Compton, a seaman brought an action for wages owed while the ship
was in port undergoing repairs, which were provided by his contract. See id. at 98. The
plaintiff also requested penalty damages, as authorized by a federal statute. Id. at 99.
However, the statute, by its plain language, did not support the award of penalty damages.
Id. at 101. As a result, the plaintiff received an "award of a judgment of almost $60,000,
based on an actual claim that would not exceed much over $300 at the most." Id. at 100.
137. See id. at 106 ("[B]eyond any claim for relief by the defendant for mistake (ground
1) and invalidity (ground 4), [Rule 60(b)(6)] would afford relief to the defendant under
the unusual and extraordinary circumstances of this case .... ). Compton arose prior to
the formalization of the mutual exclusivity requirement. See supra note 86 and
accompanying text.
138. See Compton, 608 F.2d at 99, 107.
139. 179 F.R.D. 252 (D. Neb. 1998).
140. See id. at 258-59.
141. Id. at 259.
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In Thompson v. Bell,142 the Sixth Circuit held that Rule 60(b)(6)
relief was available to a death row inmate in a civil habeas corpus
action where the district court incorrectly concluded that the
petitioner had failed to exhaust state remedies. 143 In Thompson, the
petitioner chose not to appeal four charges of ineffective assistance of
counsel to the Tennessee Supreme Court. 144 Shortly thereafter, the
Tennessee Supreme Court clarified that such an appeal was not
required to exhaust in-state remedies. 145 Thompson involved a
deliberate change to Tennessee state civil procedure rules, 146 unlike
many of the other cases identified in this Recent Development, in
which a nonfederal judicial body heard and decided an issue of state
or administrative law incorrectly. 47However, it is analogous to the
other cases discussed because it suggests that the Tennessee Supreme
Court had a different conception of its own law than the federal
court.
In Compton, Whitmore, and Thompson, the adverse judgment
resulted from both an error on the part of the court and by the
parties. In Thompson and Whitmore, the error resulted when the
federal court was speculating as to another judicial body's
jurisdiction. Further, in all three cases, the petitioners were not
faultless in the occurrences of the adverse judgment and had made
free, calculated decisions in the course of their claims. All of these
cases indicate that Rule 60(b)(6) relief may be an appropriate ground
for remedying a situation where a court error results in an unjust final
verdict despite the plaintiff's fault in strategy.
It should be noted that Rule 60 may provide other grounds on
which to correct a court error. Some commentators have suggested
Rule 60(b)(1), 4 s which allows relief from a final judgment due to
"mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect," as a grounds
for correcting a court error.14 9 However, the Court in Liljeberg
appeared to consider court actions as falling outside of Rule

142.
143.
144.
145.
146.
147.

580 F.3d 423 (6th Cir. 2009).
Id. at 442, 444.
Id. at 433.
Id.
See id.
See, e.g., Whitmore v. Avery, 179 F.R.D. 252, 259 (D. Neb. 1998) (allowing Rule

60(b)(6) relief where a court mistakenly dismissed for administrative exhaustion).
148. FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(1).
149. See generally Note, Relief from Final Judgment Under Rule 60(b)(1) Due to
Judicial Errors of Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1571 (1985) (arguing that Rule 60(b)(1) should
be a ground for correcting a court error in some situations).
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60(b)(1)."5 ° In addition, the consequence of addressing relief for a
court error under Rule 60(b)(1) is that, unlike Rule 60(b)(6), Rule
60(b)(1) is subject to a one-year time limitation.'5 1
C.

Recent Trends: Departingfrom Ackermann and the Categorical
Approach

Another line of cases has more directly departed from the
categorical approach to Rule 60(b)(6) relief. In a D.C. Circuit case,
Randall v. Merrill Lynch, 5 2 a petitioner's "disabling illness" and
financial concerns caused him to enter a second voluntary dismissal in
a securities action.153 Under the Federal Rules, a second voluntary
dismissal operates as an adjudication on the merits.'5 4 A little more
than one year later, the petitioner filed a Rule 60(b)(6) motion to
vacate the judgment.155 The D.C. Circuit upheld the lower court's
decision to vacate the judgment, and distinguished Randall from
Ackermann:
Ackermann prohibits a court from utilizing Rule 60(b)(6) to
relieve a party from a voluntary dismissal based only on
financial hardship. In this case, however, the lower court found
that [the petitioner] suffered a disabling illness that would have
permitted his participation in the litigation only at the risk of
even greater disability. We find that the district court did not
abuse its discretion in determining that this combination of
health and financial considerations was sufficient to permit
56
relief under Rule 60(b)(6). 1
It is not at all clear that the distinction drawn by the Randall court
was significant. After all, the petitioner in Ackermann faced
confinement, loss of his house, and deportation;157 these factors could
easily surpass the hardships encountered in Randall.
In a recent First Circuit case, Ungar v. Palestine Liberation
5 8 the court examined "whether
Organization,'
there is a categorical
rule that a party whose strategic choices lead to the entry of a default

150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.

See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 863 (1988).
See FED. R. Civ. P. 60(c)(1); Note, supra note 149, at 1580-82.
820 F.2d 1317 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
Id. at 1319-20.
See FED. R. Civ. P. 41.
Randall, 820 F.2d at 1320.
Id. at 1321.
See Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193, 196 (1950).
599 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2010).
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judgment is precluded as a matter of law from later obtaining relief
from that judgment under [Rule] 60(b)(6)."15' 9 It concluded that "no
categorical bar applie[d]."'' l In Ungar, the estates of two persons
killed in a terrorist attack brought a claim against the Palestine
Liberation Organization ("PLO") and the Palestinian Authority
("PA") under the Antiterrorism Act. 161 The plaintiffs complained
that the PLO and the PA had given aid to Hamas, a Palestinian
political party considered a terrorist organization by the U.S.
government.1 62 However, the defendants chose to attack the court's
jurisdiction rather than defend the Antiterrorism Act charges on the

merits. 163 The court explained:
The defendants neither answered the complaint nor
participated in discovery. Instead, at various times from 2000 to
2005 they interposed motions asserting non-merits-based
defenses of sovereign immunity, lack of jurisdiction,
nonjusticiability, and the like.... [T]he decision to stonewall in
this fashion was a deliberate stratagem driven by the advice of
their then-counsel and their unwillingness to recognize the
authority of the federal courts. 164
This approach was ineffective. Ultimately, in 2004, a default judgment
of more than $232 million was assessed against the PLO and the PA.165
By 2007, "[t]he PLO and the PA [came] under new
'
leadership."166
This new leadership apparently desired to take a
"different approach to litigation" within the United States. 16 7 Both
defendants moved to reopen the judgment in the district court, which
refused their motion. 168 It reasoned that " 'a litigant's strategic choice
to default precludes a finding of exceptional circumstances under

159. Id. at 81.

160. Id.
161. Id. at 82. The Antiterrorism Act, Pub. L. 101-519, § 132, 104 Stat. 2250 (codified as
amended at 18 U.S.C. §§ 2331-2339D (2006)), "provides a cause of action in favor of
American nationals harmed by acts of international terrorism." Ungar, 599 F.3d at 82
(citing 18 U.S.C. § 2333).
162. Ungar, 599 F.3d at 82; U.S. DEP'T OF STATE, COUNTRY REPORTS ON TERRORISM
2010, at 87 (2011), availableat http://www.state.gov/documents/organization/170479.pdf.
163. Ungar,599 F.3d at 82.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 82 n.2. The judgment went unsatisfied. See id. at 82.
166. Id. at 82.
167. Id.
168. Id. at 82-84; see also Estates of Ungar v. Palestinian Auth., 613 F. Supp. 2d 219,
228-31 (D.R.I. 2009) (holding defendants not entitled to vacatur of default judgment),
vacated, Ungar v. Palestine Liberation Org., 599 F.3d 79 (1st Cir. 2010).
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Rule 60(b)(6)' and, thus, precludes relief.' 1 69 The district court rested
its decision on the strategic choices of the defendants alone, without
significant consideration of any other factors. 170
The First Circuit concluded that the district court erred in not
considering factors other than the strategic choices made by the PLO
and the PA.'71 The court of appeals remanded the issue to the district
court, with directions to consider the "timing of the request for relief,
the extent of any prejudice to the opposing party, the existence or
non-existence of meritorious claims of defense, and the presence or
absence of exceptional circumstances." 172
The First Circuit, in Ungar, stated that a "mechanical, multifactor analysis" approach need not be required in every Rule 60(b)(6)
case. 173 Yet, at the same time, the First Circuit urged the lower court
to consider multiple factors in Ungar, including timing, potential
prejudice, and the justification for the petitioning parties' actions.7 4 It
is hard to see how consistency can be reached if there are no set
factors to guide the district court in every Rule 60(b)(6) case. The
First Circuit's decision in Ungar, while motivated by an admirable
policy consideration, may have gone a step too far.
Ungar and Randall are two cases that defy the categorical
approach to Rule 60(b)(6) relief. It is doubtful that either case can be
meaningfully reconciled with Ackermann. Instead, these cases seem
to directly contradict the holding of Ackermann. While a more liberal
approach may be appropriate in many situations, it is important to
remember that there are two considerations driving Rule 60(b)(6)
relief: the need for the court to accomplish justice and the need for
175
finality in the court system.
In accepting that, in rare instances, justice can only be
accomplished by granting the petitioner relief from a judgment

169. Ungar, 599 F.3d at 84 (quoting Estates of Ungar,613 F. Supp. 2d at 229).
170. See id. at 83.
171. See id. at 83-84. There is a key difference in the standard of review in the Fourth
and First Circuits: the First Circuit addresses the underlying question of law de novo,
whereas the Fourth Circuit reviews the underlying holding for abuse of discretion.
Compare Aikens v. Ingram, 652 F.3d 496, 501 (4th Cir. 2011) ("We review the district
court's ruling on a 60(b) motion for abuse of discretion .... "), with Ungar, 599 F.3d at 83
("[Abuse of discretion] standard is not monolithic: within it, embedded findings of fact are
reviewed for clear error, questions of law are reviewed de novo, and judgment calls
subjected to classic abuse-of-discretion review.").
172. Ungar, 599 F.3d at 83.
173. Id. at 86.
174. Id. at 83.
175. See Moore & Rogers, supra note 82, at 623.
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brought by the petitioner's own strategic choice, these cases
embraced the realization that a flexible approach to Rule 60(b)(6)
analysis is sometimes necessary. 17 6 The alternative, more rigid
categorical view, like that taken by the Fourth Circuit in Aikens, leads
to unjust results.
III. PROBLEMS WITH THE FOURTH CIRCUIT APPROACH

The result in Aikens is counterintuitive. 717 There are several
grounds upon which to criticize Aikens.178 This Recent Development
limits discussion to two of the broader problems created by Aikens.
First, Aikens is wasteful. It may encourage unnecessary appeals and
increase strain on the court system. Second, on a more fundamental
level, the Fourth Circuit's approach in Aikens risks undercutting the
very purpose of Rule 60(b)(6), and in doing so, may diminish the
credibility of the court system.
A.

Unnecessary Strains on the Court

The Supreme Court created the extraordinary circumstances
requirement largely in order to promote judicial efficiency.17 9 A
primary concern in Aikens was that Rule 60(b)(6) would be used to
distort and circumvent the appeals process.18 ° However, the question
should not be merely whether the Rule allows litigants to avoid an
appeal. Rather, the question should be whether allowing a Rule
60(b)(6) motion constitutes a harmful substitute to the appeals
process.18 An expansive and inflexible reading of Ackermann

176. See generally Don Zupanec, Relief from Judgment-Willful Default-Rule
60(b)(6) Relief, FED. LITIGATOR, May 2010, at 133, 133 (discussing Ungar and its impact
on the Rule 60(b)(6) case law).
177. After reviewing the facts and holding of Aikens, one scholar concluded, simply,
"[t]hat can't be right." Dodson, supra note 62, at 116.
178. See id. Dodson's discussion more completely addresses the problematic standard
of review employed by the Fourth Circuit and articulates another possible criticism:
namely, that the holding of Aikens "requires perfect foresight in choosing among
reasonable litigation options." Id.
179. See Ackermann v. United States, 340 U.S. 193,198 (1950) ("There must be an end
to litigation someday ... ").
180. See Aikens v. Ingram, 652 F.3d 496, 501 (4th Cir. 2011) ("To give Rule 60(b)(6)
broad application would undermine numerous other rules that favor the finality of
judgments .... ).
181. See Note, supra note 149, at 1576 (arguing that, in some situations, using Rule
60(b)(1) is an appropriate means of remedying a final judgment).
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completely undermines the reality that, occasionally, it will be
18 2
efficient to allow a litigant to circumvent the appeals process.
Aikens provides just such a case. Four years of circular litigation
on procedural issues does not promote adjudication on the merits,
nor does it cut down on the amount of work on the federal docket.'83
But in Aikens, the Fourth Circuit gave Ackermann an unbridled
reading, even though the strategic decision was beneficial to all
parties involved, except Aikens, and indeed significantly reduced the
strain on the court. In doing so, the Fourth Circuit adopted a grossly
inefficient approach." s
It is true that the ability to request a stay mitigates this
inefficiency somewhat. The problem discussed above will only
present itself in situations where a court denies a stay, pending
administrative exhaustion. However, particularly troubling in the
majority opinion is that the court seemed to base its reasoning not
only on the failure to request a stay, but also on the decision not to
appeal the district court's assessment of ABCMR's jurisdiction. The
Fourth Circuit stated that "if Aikens was convinced that the district
court erred in dismissing his action for failure to exhaust
administrative remedies, as he apparently was, he should have
' Aikens suggests that a petitioner
appealed, but he did not."185
can be
faulted for not appealing a court determination of jurisdiction, rather
than complying, even though the alternative approach would be, in an
objective sense, quicker and less expensive. 8 6 It would be difficult to
state this point more clearly than Judge King did in his dissenting
opinion in Aikens:
[W]hat would Aikens have gained from an appeal? Less than
seven months after the dismissal, Aikens was back before the
court with an unequivocal decree that the ABCMR was an
improper forum for this particular dispute, from no less an
182. Cf. id. (discussing how allowing litigants to use Rule 60(b)(1) to avoid an appeal
can, in some situations, provide "an efficient alternative to appeal").
183. "In another case, the majority would be right to jealously protect the familiar, if
amorphous, principle that litigation, at some point, must be suffered to end. In this case,
however, the litigation has not been suffered to begin." Aikens, 652 F.3d at 518 (King, J.,
dissenting).
184. For purposes of this Recent Development, efficient actions are those that
minimize the joint costs of the parties involved. See generally DAVID D. FRIEDMAN,
LAW'S ORDER: WHAT ECONOMICS HAS To Do WITH LAW AND WHY IT MATTERS 297-

308 (2000) (discussing the theory that judicial opinions mimic economic theories on
efficiency so as to minimize the joint costs of the parties involved).
185. Aikens, 652 F.3d at 502.
186. See id.
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authority than the ABCMR itself. There was virtually no
chance that we would have rendered a comparable judgment so
quickly, given our systemic druthers for orderly briefing,
unhurried argument, and deliberate decision-making. The only
advantage that Aikens would have realized from a Fourth
Circuit judgment is the insurance it would have provided
against a second unanticipated and unjustified refusal of the
187
district court to entertain the merits of his claim.
In short, this is precisely the type of situation where the appeals
process should be discouraged. The holding of Aikens is that failure
to appeal a dismissal without prejudice, or obtain a stay, may bar
Rule 60(b)(6) relief, even if that appeal serves no function but to
satisfy the letter of Ackermann. The guidance that Aikens gives to
attorneys is twofold. First, it directs attorneys to seek a stay pending
administrative review. This is a perfectly reasonable expectation to
place on attorneys; however, a request for a stay is by no means a
guarantee. The second piece of guidance from Aikens is to appeal
rather than comply with district court decisions because an appeal will
keep the claim alive.188 Of course, in many cases, requiring an appeal
does serve some function. "[I]f courts granted [Rule 60(b)(6)] relief
freely, parties could potentially circumvent the appeals process," thus
distorting the oversight function of courts of appeals." 9 But
application of Ackermann to all cases is overly broad, requiring
adherence to formalism in cases where justice would better be served
by following the legal principles that support the use of Rule 60(b)(6).
By requiring an appeal in all instances, the court will cause a new
wave of unnecessary litigation. Rather than reducing litigation,
Aikens merely moves the litigation forward in time.
B.

Credibility of the Court

Although the procedural requirements created by Aikens are
troubling, a more fundamental problem with Aikens exists-namely,
that a potentially valid case on the merits was dismissed on a
procedural technicality after more than four years of persistent

187. Id. at 513-14 (King, J., dissenting).
188. Judge Davis starts his dissenting opinion in Aikens by noting: "As best as I can
discern, the majority's admonishment to counsel facing analogous circumstances in the
future seems to be: 'Appeal everything, all the time, right away.' " Id. at 521 (Davis, J.,
dissenting).
189. Meadows, supra note 70, at 1010.
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litigation. Results like the one in Aikens risk undermining the
integrity of the federal justice system.
The federal court system is susceptible to losing public
confidence whenever it allows an injustice to continue. As
demonstrated by Liljeberg, the mere perception of injustice risks loss
of public confidence. 19 The majority in Aikens was rightly careful to
avoid discussing the merits of the case.19 1 A principled application of a
deferential standard of review may be a defensible ground for
allowing Aikens's claims to fail. However the problematic point of
Aikens is not captured in the language of the opinion but rather in the
perception of injustice the result harbors. 192
This is a problem, not only in Aikens, but in Rule 60(b)(6) cases
generally. The inconsistent case law coupled with a deferential
standard of review seems to give courts the ability to prematurely
eject cases they perceive as unworthy on procedural grounds.
Although the federal judiciary needs procedural rules in order to
fairly and efficiently review the merits of an individual claim,
procedural rules should not weigh directly on a claim's validity. 193
Even the perception that a rule is being used to improperly influence
the outcome of a case, or to avoid deciding a highly salient issue, is
dangerous.
Clear legal standards that closely approximate the procedural
interest of the court will help the public fully understand the court's
reasoning. Thus, such decisions will increase the court's credibility.

190. See Liljeberg v. Health Servs. Acquisition Corp., 486 U.S. 847, 864-65 (1988)
(using Rule 60(b)(6) to reopen a final judgment in where district judge improperly failed
to recuse himself).
191. The concurring opinion does briefly examine the unsympathetic aspects of the
case but is careful to indicate that this discussion is ancillary to its reasoning. See Aikens,
652 F.3d at 507 (Diaz, J., concurring).
192. It could be argued that Aikens presented less than ideal facts upon which to
address a novel constitutional question. After all, the question of what constitutional rights
we afford our deployed military service men would likely be a highly salient issue. See
supra note 41. No matter how that question would have been answered, the consequences
for the military and its employees would have been far reaching. Further, Aikens was
alleged to have maintained a hostile command climate and to have engaged in
inappropriate relations with women. See Amended Complaint, supra note 25, 1 37-38.
These facts could dampen sympathy for Aikens. However, they likely would not be
material to the underlying constitutional question. See supra note 41 (noting that the court
would have likely looked to the deployed soldier's reasonable expectations of privacy). If
the multiple investigations were truly unjustified and retaliatory, then it would seem that
military employees were engaged in the exact type of unchecked government behavior
that the Fourth Amendment seeks to regulate.
193. See Rules Enabling Act, 28 U.S.C. § 2072 (2006) (indicating that the Rules of Civil
Procedure shall not "abridge, enlarge or modify any substantive right").
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Conversely, inflexible, complex, or overly broad standards for purely
procedural issues will diminish the credibility of the court. Rule 60
reflects the need to depart from haphazard and capricious common
law doctrines available to remedy unjust final judgments. It pits the
court's interest in the finality of judgments against the court's interest
in effectuating justice. Thus, it should be one of the judiciary's
greatest tools available to restore public confidence in the federal
justice system. Instead, the Fourth Circuit pursued a course which
neither promoted consistency nor reached a satisfying result.
C. ProposedSolutions
There are several standards that could be employed to avoid the
problems created by Aikens. The ideal rule would promote the
efficient use of Rule 60(b)(6), so as to mitigate the strain on the
federal courts, while also allowing the court to better convey the
appearance of justice and doctrinal clarity in Rule 60(b)(6) relief.
In a recent essay entitled Rethinking Extraordinary
Circumstances,'9 4 Professor Scott Dodson proposed an interesting
solution. 195 He argued that "the Ackermann rule ought not to apply
when a litigant chooses a litigation option that is a reasonable way to
continue pressing his legal claims. 19 6 Thus "the Ackermann rule
[would only apply] to a litigation choice that deliberately ends the
dispute, such as settling the claims or abandoning the case
altogether."' 197 Dodson limits his argument by stating that Ackermann
should still apply when the movant pursued a strategy that was
'
"patently unreasonable or fanciful,"198
such as when a litigant is
"pursuing a course clearly foreclosed by binding precedent."1 99
This is a succinct and compelling framework through which to
evaluate Rule 60(b)(6) motions. However, it may be overly broad.
Specifically, Dodson's standard seems to excuse cases where binding
precedent is missing, or completely absent. But, in many cases, these
are the exact instances where the appeals process should be
encouraged. Thus, while Dodson's framework would help to increase
the credibility of the court, it would not necessarily help promote the
efficient use of Rule 60(b)(6). Dodson's framework also stops one
step short of giving a comprehensive rule. As stated, Dodson places
194.
195.
196.
197.
198.
199.

Dodson, supra note 62.
See id. at 118.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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the emphasis entirely on the petitioning party's actions. It does not
directly consider the prejudice to the other litigants or the additional
strain imposed on the court.
This Recent Development suggests altering Dodson's approach
so that it blends deciding when Ackermann should apply with the
prejudice analysis. Rule 60(b)(6) should be available to litigants who
make fatal procedural errors in good faith and in pursuit of
adjudication on the merits. However, availability of this type of relief
should be limited where a litigant or a third party is unduly prejudiced
or the strain on the court is substantial. Such a standard would
promote the efficient use of Rule 60(b)(6) and also help promote
doctrinal clarity.
This standard would also lead to superior results in cases such as
Ungar and Randall. In both cases, the petitioners took actions that
were not in pursuit of the merits, either by attempting to avoid
adjudication through a failed legal strategy2" or by filing for a second
voluntary dismissal.2"' These are instances where justice does not
seem to require reopening the litigation.
Applying such a rule in Aikens would have led to a more
satisfying result. Aikens pursued a strategy that was clearly in pursuit
of adjudication on the merits, and the defendants suffered no undue
prejudice. One cannot be prejudiced by the vacation of a judgment
that was not disputed on the merits, especially when there was no
delay and the dispute was being actively litigated.0 2 Although a court
must be able to control its docket through procedural mechanisms,
the strategic decisions of Aikens's attorneys actually lessened the
strain on the judiciary. Instead of spending years pursuing an appeal
which may or may not have correctly predicted ABCMR's
jurisdictional limits, Aikens spent just months getting a definite
statement of ABCMR's jurisdiction from ABCMR itself. And while a
stay, if granted, would have avoided the Rule 60(b)(6) litigation upon
returning to federal court, there was no other course of action
available to the petitioner that could have achieved a quicker result. 03

200. See Ungar v. Palestine Liberation Org., 599 F.3d 79, 82 (1st Cir. 2010); supra notes
158-65 and accompanying text.
201. See Randall v. Merrill Lynch, 820 F.2d 1317, 1319-20 (D.C. Cir. 1987); supra notes
152-57 and accompanying text.
202. Cf Compton v. Alton S.S. Co., 608 F.2d 96, 103 (1979) ("Nor can the plaintiff be
said to be prejudiced by the vacation of his judgment for statutory penalty wages, to which
he is not legally entitled. One cannot be prejudiced by the loss of that to which he was not
entitled.").
203. See Aikens v. Ingram, 652 F.3d 496, 513 (4th Cir. 2011) (King, J., dissenting).
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There is another ground on which extraordinary circumstances
should be found, regardless of the petitioner's strategic mistakes.
Rule 60(b)(6) relief should be available when a court makes an
inaccurate judgment that is latent during the appeals period and that
would otherwise result in substantial injustice. The latency
requirement would not mean that the circumstance causing the
adverse final judgment must be completely unforeseeable. Instead,
latency means that there was insufficient knowledge available to
foresee it. This would capture cases like Liljeberg, where the court
error was not apparent during the appeals period. It would also cover
dismissals that are based on a false premise, including cases where a
judge incorrectly speculates about the rules of another judicial or
quasi-judicial body.
This standard would have led to a superior result in Aikens.
Aikens would not have been punished for the necessarily speculative
decision by the federal court. Further, this standard would bar
application of Rule 60(b)(6) in cases like Ungar, in which the district
court's decision was clearly supported as a matter of existing law and
the petitioner's grounds for relief were clearly appealable during the
appeals process. It would also bar application of Rule 60(b)(6) in
cases like Randall, in which the petitioners chose a course of action
with full knowledge that it would bar their claims.
These standards would constitute a fairly modest modification of
the existing extraordinary circumstances doctrine. Importantly,
neither approach would modify the fact that the petitioner has the
burden of persuading the court that extraordinary circumstances
20 4
exist. Thus, these standards would act as a rebuttable presumption
that the facts alleged do not constitute an extraordinary circumstance.
However, both standards would better allow Rule 60(b)(6) to remedy
truly unjust results.
CONCLUSION

In Aikens, a restrictive approach to Rule 60(b)(6) relief led to an
unjust result. The holding of Aikens runs counter to the purposes of
Rule 60(b)(6) and trends in the case law. Aikens is wasteful in that it

204. There is obviously a difference between the legal burden and the factual burden.
A Rule 60(b) motion initially resolves all facts in favor of the moving party. A hearing
may then be required where the litigant must support his factual contentions. E.g.
Klapprott v. United States, 336 U.S. 942, 942 (1949) (clarifying that, for Rule 60
(b)(6) motions, a hearing to determine the veracity of the allegations constituting
extraordinary circumstances is necessary).
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unnecessarily extends litigation, and its holding will undermine the
integrity of the court. There are at least two standards that could be
applied to Rule 60(b)(6) relief that would lead to a different result.
Under one standard, a court would look to whether the petitioner
acted in good faith and in pursuit of litigation on the merits, while
also considering the hardships that reopening a final judgment create
for other parties. The other standard would allow for Rule 60(b)(6)
relief when the court made a latent error.
It is likely that the two competing interests embodied in Rule
60(b)(6) will never be completely harmonized in any single rule or
statement of law. But, as relayed by the court in Thompson,
''conventional notions of finality of litigation have no place where life
or liberty is at stake and infringement of constitutional rights is
alleged."2 5 In cases like Aikens, where the circumstances can only be
characterized as truly extraordinary, the court's interest in justice
should overcome its commitment to procedural formality.
FREDERICK JOHNSON

205. Thompson v. Bell, 580 F.3d 423, 444 (6th Cir. 2009) (quoting Sanders v. United
States, 373 U.S. 1, 8 (1963) (internal quotation marks omitted)).

